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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the lower court's finding of fact that 
plaintiff's bills to defendant became due and payable on the 10th 
of the month after billing, (thereby starting the running of the 
four year Statute of Limitations) is clearly erroneous. 
Standard of Review; Findings of fact should not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard must be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Whether the lower court's finding of fact that 
defendant's long time employee had apparent authority to purchase 
a generator is clearly erroneous. 
Standard of Review; Findings of fact should not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard must be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
None 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves plaintiff, Petersen Electric Inc.'s action 
against defendant David Williams for goods and services delivered 
by plaintiff on a time and material basis. The plaintiff performed 
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the work for defendant on an hourly rate plus materials and then 
later sent bills for the defendant to pay. The defendant did not 
know the amount to pay until after receiving the bill. 
Notwithstanding the fact the plaintiff's action was brought within 
4 years of the date that defendant received bills, defendant claims 
that plaintiff's action is barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
The lower court made a finding of fact that the plaintiff's 
bills to defendant did not become due and payable until the 10th of 
the month following billing. The plaintiff contends that the 
Statute of Limitations did not begin to run until the bills became 
due and payable, thereby making plaintiff's present action against 
defendant timely. 
One of the items that defendant purchased from plaintiff was 
a generator. The generator was ordered by defendant's long time 
trusted employee, Mr. Don Lloyd. Prior to Mr. Lloyd's ordering a 
new generator the defendant had asked that the plaintiff repair 
defendant's older generator. At that time the parties thought the 
only thing wrong with the generator was a "seized" engine. 
However, when plaintiff began to take the old generator apart, it 
discovered that not only was the engine "seized/' the armature in 
the generating portion was burned making the generator worthless. 
Thereafter, this information was conveyed to the defendant. Mr. 
Lloyd later called the plaintiff and placed an order for a new 
generator. The new generator cost roughly the same amount as it 
would have cost to rebuild the old generator. The lower court 
entered a finding of fact that Mr. Lloyd, at the time he ordered 
2 
the new generator to replace the worthless old generator, was 
acting with apparent authority from defendant. On appeal, 
defendant disputes this finding of fact. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff, Petersen Electric, Inc., is a Utah Corporation 
owned by Mr. Mac Petersen. Plaintiff is in the business of 
electrical contracting, radio communications, and generator sales 
and services. 
2. Defendant, David Williams, is the owner of two companies, 
Industrial Communications Inc. and General Broadcasting Inc. dba 
KFAM Radio Station. Although both companies are now corporations, 
the lower court found that at the time of the sales and services 
relevant hereto, both companies were dba's or alter egos of Mr. 
Williams. (R. 332-333) Thus, plaintiff's judgment in this case is 
entered against Mr. Williams personally. (R. 353) 
3. Plaintiff's action is for unpaid credit sales and 
services. The lower court found that sums set forth in invoices 
marked as trial exhibits 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 in the 
total amount of $13,424.74, were properly owed by defendant and 
were not barred by the Statute of Limitations since suit was filed 
within four years of billing. The court ruled that invoices 
introduced as exhibits 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 were not owed 
by the defendant since these invoices were billed more than 4 years 
before plaintiff instituted legal action. (R. 347-350) 
4. Plaintiff and defendant have a business relationship 
extending back approximately 20 years. (R. 394-395) During 13 or 
3 
14 years of this time defendant had an employee he characterized as 
trusted and valuable. (R. 542, lines 7-8) This employee, named Don 
Lloyd, served as Service Manager in one of Mr. William's companies 
and Chief Engineer in another. (R. 580-592) In the course of 
business dealings it was common practice for Mr. Lloyd to call 
plaintiff and other vendors to order services and materials on 
behalf of defendant's companies. (R. 424-425, R. 585, R. 594, R. 
608, R. 619) Mr. Lloyd signed work authorizations on behalf of 
defendant when the vendor required such. (R. 629, lines 10-25) 
Mr. Lloyd signed for goods delivered on credit. (R. 631-632) Mr. 
Lloyd negotiated modifications in partially performed contracts. 
(R. 397, lines 3-11) Overall, Mr. Lloyd had very broad authority 
to purchase goods for defendant's companies. As one vendor 
testified at trial, Don Lloyd "was the man to talk to" at 
defendant's companies. (R. 626, line 4) Mac Petersen testified 
that in his company's relationship with defendant's companies, 
defendant turned virtually everything over Don Lloyd. (R. 397) 
5. Plaintiff provided its services to defendant on a time 
and material basis. (R. 307) Plaintiff's employees would keep 
daily records of the hours worked and materials used. (R. 421, 658) 
The daily diaries would later serve as the basis for a bill or 
invoice sent by plaintiff to defendant. The invoice summarized the 
work, the number of hours, the hourly rate and the cost of 
materials to reach a final invoice amount. (See e.g. Trial Exhibit 
18) 
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6. Sometimes plaintiff delayed sending a bill to defendant 
to make sure that the work performed by plaintiff solved the 
problem the defendant had been having. Sometimes bills were 
delayed for other reasons which the lower court found "reasonable." 
(R. 311, 346) 
7. The invoices did not become due and payable until the 
10th of the month after billing. (R. 3 35) Each of the invoices 
stated "terms net 10th prox." indicating payment was due on the 
10th of the month following billing. (R. 456-457) Many such 
invoices were signed by defendant's authorized employees. (R. 545-
546, Trial Exhibits 2, 5, 9, 10, 11) The plaintiff did not expect 
payment until after billing. (R. 470, lines 8-12) The defendant 
did not know the amount to pay until after billing. (R. 307) The 
defendant did not believe he was required to pay until the bill 
came in. (R. 528, line 18) 
8. All of the invoices set forth in trial exhibits 3, 12, 
13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 were mailed to defendant on September 30, 
1985 or after. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on October 3, 1989. 
9. The lower court entered a specific finding of fact that 
under the arrangements between plaintiff and defendant, payment did 
not become due until the 10th of the month after billing. Thus, 
all of plaintiff's invoices allowed by the lower court did not 
become due and payable until October 10, 1985 at the earliest. (R. 
335) 
10. One of the items sold by plaintiff to defendant was a 
backup generator for defendant's broadcasting facilities on Kesler 
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Peak to the West of Salt Lake City. This sale became necessary 
after plaintiff's employees flew with defendant's employee, Don 
Lloyd, to the defendant's transmitter on Kesler Peak. (R. 430) The 
purpose of the trip was to repair the generator on the mountain. 
When the crew arrived it was discovered that the gasoline engine 
that drives the electricity generating armature in the generator 
was "seized." Consequently, the entire generator had to be flown 
down the mountain to the plaintiff's shop. (R. 4 31) 
11. After the generator was down the mountain, defendant, 
David Williams took a quote from plaintiff for fixing the seized 
engine. At that point both parties assumed the seized engine was 
the only thing wrong with the generator. (R. 431, lines 20-25) 
Mr. Williams then directed plaintiff to do the work. After 
plaintiff's shop foreman began taking the generator apart, 
plaintiff discovered that not only did the generator have a seized 
engine, but the other main part of the generator, the armature, was 
also burned out. (R. 432, 568, 642) This discovery left the 
generator worthless and made the cost of repairing the old 
generator about the same cost as buying an entirely new generator. 
(R. 432-434, R. 644, lines 21-25, R. 647) 
12. After learning this new information, Don Lloyd called the 
plaintiff on the telephone and placed an order on behalf of 
defendant's company for a new generator. (R. 434)l Relying upon 
defendant claims that Don Lloyd testified at trial that 
plaintiff did not tell Don Lloyd that Mr. Williams had asked that 
the generator be repaired. Defendant refers to R. 585 (see 
defendant's brief p. 12). Don Lloyd did not testify in the manner 
in defendant's brief. Mr. Lloyd never made the statement defendant 
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this order plaintiff ordered a new generator from the manufacturer 
(plaintiff did not have commercial generators of that type in 
stock). (R. 645) 
13. After plaintiff delivered the new generator to defendant 
Don Lloyd called Mr. Petersen to ask if Mr. Petersen could rewrite 
the invoices to show the generator as a rebuild rather than a new 
generator. (R. 435) This was the first plaintiff learned that Mr. 
Lloyd was being second guessed by Mr. Williams. (R. 435-436) 
However, by then plaintiff had already incurred the liability with 
his supplier. (R. 437) At trial Don Lloyd testified when he placed 
the order he thought Mr. Williams would want a new generator rather 
than a total rebuild for the same price. 
14. The lower court made a finding of fact that Don Lloyd 
acted with apparent authority in ordering the new generator. (R. 
308-309) The lower court also found that ordering a new generator 
was the economically advisable action for the defendant to have 
taken when Mr. Lloyd placed the order on behalf of defendant. (R. 
308-309). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1) In determining the indent of the parties on an oral 
contract, the trial court should consider all the evidence, 
including the contract's purpose, nature and subject matter. 
attributes to Mr. Lloyd. (See R. 585) Moreover, it is obvious 
from the abundance of testimony that Mr. Lloyd knew that the 
generator had been sent in for repair, but that plaintiff had found 
the generator worthless. (R. 581, lines 16-21, R. 582, R. 430, R. 
433) After all, Mr. Lloyd directed the initial trip to retrieve 
the generator off the mountain. (R. 430) 
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Construction of an oral contract is for the trier of fact. The 
lower court in this case determined that the evidence demonstrated 
defendant's debt to plaintiff was not due and payable until the 
10th of the month following billing. The great weight of the 
evidence supports the lower court's finding of fact in this regard. 
Since the debt did not become due and payable until 10 days after 
billing, the 4 year Statute of Limitations did not begin to run 
until 10 days after billing. Hence, plaintiff's law suit against 
defendant is not barred by the four year Statute of Limitations. 
2) The lower court's finding of fact that defendant's 
employee, Don Lloyd, acted with apparent authority in purchasing a 
generator on behalf of defendant is supported by the weight of the 
evidence and is not clearly erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE FOUR YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGAN TO RUN ON THE 10TH OF 
THE MONTH FOLLOWING BILLING, THE DATE THE BILL BECAME DUE AND 
PAYABLE 
The plaintiff in this case commenced its action within four 
years of the time the defendant received bills. The defendant 
argues that the Statute of Limitations barred the plaintiff's 
action because the statute began to run from the time the contracts 
were performed rather than the time that the defendant was billed. 
This argument fails because: 1) the lower court made a specific 
finding of fact that the bills did not become due and payable until 
the 10th of the month following billing and the evidence plainly 
supports this finding of fact; 2) pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court's finding of fact cannot 
be overturned unless clearly erroneous; and, 3) as a matter of law 
credit sales, such as the ones from Petersen Electric to David R. 
Williams only become due on demand (or billing) unless the contract 
specifically states otherwise; in the present case, demand was not 
made until Petersen Electric sent its bills. 
The following subsections will consider each of these 
arguments in further detail. 
A. The "Clearly Erroneous11 Standard of Review 
Applies to the Lower Court's Finding Fact that 
"the Invoices did not become Due Until the 
10th of the Month Following Billing." 
This case was tried to the court, Judge Timothy R. Hanson. 
The defendant contends that no deference should be given to Judge 
Hanson's conclusions on the Statute of Limitations issue. 
(defendant's brief P. 2) Defendant further argues that payment is 
due upon performance "absent an agreement to the contrary." 
(appellant's brief P. 7) Defendant then goes on to state: 
Each agreement in its fundamental terms was: When 
Petersen provides the specified materials, supplies or 
labor, then Williams will pay. Williams' obligation to 
pay accrued immediately upon final delivery and 
performance giving Petersen an immediate right to sue for 
payment. 
(defendant's brief P. 8). 
Defendant makes this statement without reference to the record 
and cites no support for this statement. Based upon this statement 
defendant argues that the Statute of Limitations began to run 
before defendant was even billed for the work. Unfortunately, 
defendant overlooks the fact that Judge Hanson made findings of 
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fact that control this issue and his findings are subject to the 
"clearly erroneous" standard of review. In other words defendant's 
entire argument is based upon facts contrary to those found more 
believable by Judge Hanson. 
By using the words "absent an agreement to the contrary" 
defendant admits that the intent of the parties governs. Hence, if 
the parties intended that payment be due only after billing, this 
intent controls. Judge Hanson made a specific finding of fact 
indicating his conclusion that the parties intended that payment 
was not "due and payable until the 10th of the month following 
billing at the earliest." (R. 335, finding of fact number 10) 
Furthermore, the court found that the bills were calculated on a 
time and material basis and not on a firm quotation basis as 
defendant had contended. (R. 333) In its Memorandum decision the 
court stated: 
As to the claims of the plaintiff in general as to the 
amount of work performed and the amount charged, the 
Court finds that the best evidence supports the factual 
finding and the conclusions as suggested by the plaintiff 
that the work was performed on a time and materials 
basis, as opposed to a firm quote as suggested by the 
defendant . . . . 
The Court finds that the defendant's evidcmce on this 
issue is inconsistent and nonpersuasive. 
(R. 307). 
This finding supports the conclusion that billing was 
necessary before the debt became due and payable since defendant 
would not know the amount of time or materials for which he was to 
be charged until a bill was actually sent. 
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Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states in 
part, "[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses."2 A finding of fact is 
only "clearly erroneous" if it is against the clear weight of the 
evidence or if it induces the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made. Grimm v. Roberts, 784 P.2d 1238 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989); Mauahan v. Mauahan. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
Monroe. Inc. v. Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). This 
court has previously held that if a trial court bases its 
construction of a contract on "extrinsic evidence of intent, the 
construction is reviewed as a question of fact and our review is 
strictly limited." Craig Food Industries. Inc. v. Weihincr. 746 
P.2d 279, 283 (Utah App. 1987). To successfully challenge the 
trial court's finding, the defendant must marshall all of the 
evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when 
it is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court. Reid 
v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. . 776 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 
1989). Accordingly, Judge Hanson's finding of fact that the debt 
did not become due and payable until after billing should not be 
overturned unless the weight of the evidence clearly indicates that 
he made a mistake. As shall be demonstrated hereafter the evidence 
2The rule goes n to say that findings of fact can be 
manifested in formal findings or in a memorandum decision. In this 
case the court entered both. 
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supports the conclusion that the intent of the parties was that the 
debt be due and payable only after a bill was sent. 
B. The Lower Court's Finding of Fact that Payment 
did not become Due Until After Billing is 
Supported By The Evidence. 
The terms and conditions of a contract are governed first and 
foremost by the intent of the parties. Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 
813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). Construction of an oral contract, 
"is for the trier of fact." In re Relationship of Eqqers, 638 P. 2d 
1267 (Wash App. 1982) . The intent of the parties may be 
demonstrated by their actions. Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 
P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981). In determining the intent of the parties 
the court should consider the contract's "purpose, nature and 
subject matter." Driqqs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 
142 P.2d 657 (Utah 1943). In considering the "purpose, nature and 
subject matter" of the contract in the present case there is ample 
evidence to support the lower court's finding of fact that payment 
was not due until the 10th of the month after billing. 
First, as earlier stated, the lower court found that the 
contracts were time and material contracts. The defendant seldom 
asked prices in advance. (R. 419-420) The plaintiff billed 
defendant an hourly rate for its work, plus materials, in much the 
same way that a law office bills its clients an hourly rate plus 
costs. (R. 419-420) In this form of billing the customer does not 
know when to pay, the amount to pay, or even a full description of 
the work performed until after he or she has been billed. The 
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defendant admitted at trial that he did not keep records showing 
amounts owed before the bill came in. (R. 555-558). 
In the present case the defendant suggests that plaintiff had 
the right to sue before even sending a bill, (defendant's brief P. 
8) However, with a time and materials contract can it be said that 
defendant breached his agreement to pay before he even knew the 
amount to pay? The Utah Supreme Court has said the Statute of 
Limitations cannot begin to run until a breach occurs. Fredericksen 
v. Kniaht Land Corporation, 667 P.2d 34, 36 (Utah 1983); M.H. 
Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co.. 211 P.998 (Utah 1922). 
The defendant in this case could not have breached his contract 
before even being told the amount owed. Certainly it was the 
expectation of the parties that some type of bill or notice be sent 
before payment became due. On this point one court has stated 
"where (as in the instant case) demand or notice is a condition 
precedent, it is universally held that the Statute of Limitations 
does not commence to run until the notice or demand is given." 
Stice v. Peterson. 355 P.2d 948, 953 (Colo. 1960). In this case 
notice, in the form of a bill, was a condition precedent to 
payment, and to any breach, because Mr. Williams did not know how 
much to pay until billed. 
The evidence in this case indicates that Mr. Williams himself 
did not consider the debt due and payable until he received a bill. 
In fact, one of Mr. Williams' claims at trial was that he was never 
billed. The trial court noted in its memorandum decision "[w]ith 
respect to the defendant's claim that he never received any of the 
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invoices representing work done by the plaintiff, the Court finds 
no merit to that claim." (R. 310) The fact that defendant chose 
to defend his case on the claim that he never received plaintiff's 
bills is evidence of defendant's belief that billing was a 
necessary condition to payment. 
Further evidence of defendant's intent is found in his own 
testimony concerning instructions given to his employees. He told 
his employees to pay the debt "when the bill comes in." (R. 528, 
line 17, R. 555, line 11) Put another way, the employees were not 
to pay the debt until a bill was received. 
Further evidence supporting the court's finding of fact that 
payment was not due until after billing, comes from the invoices 
themselves. The defendant claims these invoices were "one sided 
ministerial acts, unilaterally sent, which did not affect the 
substance of the transaction." (defendant's brief P. 11) Defendant 
further quotes a 1968 Arizona case for the proposition that 
invoices are not bills of sale. Farm & Auto Supply v. Phoenix Fuel 
Co., 442 P.2d 88 (Arizona 1968). Unfortunately, the evidence of 
the present case completely refutes these assertions. 
It is clear the bills were not "one-sided" as claimed by the 
defendant. The plaintiff and defendant had been doing business and 
billing each other for about 20 years. (R. 394-395) On these 
invoices, as demonstrated by the trial exhibits, the words, "Terms 
Net 10th prox." appeared. Mr. Petersen testified that these words 
meant payment was due on the 10th of the month after billing (R. 
456-457, R. 146 512) Mr. Petersen clearly testified that it was 
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his intent that payment be due only after billing. (R. 456-457, 
see also R. 146) Also, the invoices say "please pay on this 
invoice" thereby indicating plaintiff's intent that the invoice 
serve as a bill. Moreover, over the years many of the invoices 
with these terms "Net. 10th prox." were signed by Mr. Williams' 
authorized employees. Five of these signed invoices were included 
as trial exhibits. (Trial exhibits 2, 5, 9, 10 and ll)3 
The parties' 20 year course of business dealing, was certainly 
a proper area of consideration for the lower court. Section 70A-2-
208(1) of the Utah Code States: 
Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions 
for performance by either party with knowledge of the 
nature of the performance and opportunity for objection 
to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or 
acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to 
determine the meaning of the agreement. 
(emphasis added) This court has held that where there is 
uncertainty, the trier of fact should examine the "background and 
surrounding circumstances" to make a determination. Sprouse v. 
Jager, 806 P.2d 219, 222 (Utah App. 1991). The background of 20 
years of billing including signed invoices with the words "Terms 
Net. 10th prox." and "please pay on this invoice" was certainly 
relevant. These facts combined with the fact that defendant never 
paid prior to billing certainly lends support to Judge Hanson's 
finding of fact that the bills were not due and payable until the 
10th of the month after billing. 
*Mr. Williams testified his employees were not acting improper 
in signing these invoices. (R. 545-546) 
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Curiously, one of the main cases defendant sites in support of 
its position, actually strongly supports affirmation of the lower 
court's decision. In William Feinstein Brothers, Inc. v. L.Z. 
Hotte Granite Co., 184 A.2d 540 (Vermont 1962) (cited in 
appellant's brief at page 7) the seller's invoices used the terms 
"2% 15 da 30 da 30 da net." The parties offered conflicting 
interpretation of this provision and a question arose as to when 
payment was due. The Vermont Court held that under these 
circumstances the issue of when payment was due was a question of 
fact, for the trier of fact, and not a question of law. id. at 
542-543. 
In the present case the meaning of the words "Terms Net. 10th 
prox.," was never really disputed. Mac Petersen was the only one 
that offered extrinsic testimony and he said it meant the invoices 
were due on the 10th of the month following billing. (R. 456-457) 
As articulated by the Vermont Court, it is for the trier of fact, 
in this case Judge Hanson, to make the final adjudication as to 
meaning and intent. The court's finding of fact that the bills 
became due and payable on the 10th of the month following billing 
shows how the trier of fact resolved the matter. 
It is clear from the record the parties understood their 
invoices to be more than the invoices described in the definition 
given by the defendant. The record shows that both plaintiff and 
the defendant used the terms "invoices" and "bills" synonymously. 
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Both parties considered invoices and bills to be the same thing,4 
Furthermore, the invoices were not drawn up at the time of 
performance• They were drawn up after service calls were 
performed, from daily diaries kept by the plaintiff's employees. 
(R. 421) Again the closest analogy is a lawyer keeping time 
records from which an invoice or bill is later composed and sent. 
In this sense the bills sent by Petersen Electric were very 
different from the traditional merchandise sales tickets being 
described by the definition utilized by defendant. Billing by 
Petersen Electric was the event that summarized the work done, and 
signaled that the bill was due and payable. (R. 456) 
Further evidence of the parties' intent that the debt was not 
due and payable until after billing is the testimony of Mac 
Petersen concerning a conversation he had with defendant. (R. 414) 
In the conversation defendant asked plaintiff when a bill was going 
to be sent on a completed project. Why would Mr. Williams ask when 
the bill would be sent unless he was wondering when he would be 
required to pay? When Mr. Petersen indicated he was going to hold 
off sending a bill for a while he drew no objection from defendant. 
4(R. 395, line 8; 397, line 5; 399, line 6; 400, line 14; 402, 
lines 4, 5; 404, line 2; 406, line 9; 410, line 3; 411, line 25; 
413, lines 12, 23; 414, lines 16, 24, 25; 415, line 2; 416, line 3; 
417, line 18; 422, line 7; 423, lines 17, 19; 427, line 11; 428, 
line 3; 437, line 21; 442, line 14; 445, line 21; 446, line 14; 
447, line 18; 449, line 9; 453, line 2; 454, line 2; 458, lines 10, 
11; 459, line 10; 460, lines 4, 12, 24; 462, line 11; 463, line 13; 
467, line 24; 468, line 3; 470, line 9; 471, line 9; 472, line 9; 
478, lines 16, 25; 484, line 4; 572, lines 7, 10; 573, lines 3, 4, 
6, 11, 13, 16, 20; 575, lines 12 13, 17, 23; 576, line 1; 577, 
lines 9, 10; 578, lines 15, 19, 22; 621, line 2; 622, line 2; 659, 
line 10; 661, line 1). 
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The tenor of the conversation is that both plaintiff and defendant 
considered billing a prerequisite to the obligation becoming due 
and payable. As indicated earlier, a bill must become due and 
payable before the Statute of Limitations can begin to run. O'Hair 
v. Kounalis, 463 P.2d 799, 800 (Utah 1970). 
Further evidence that the parties did not consider the debt 
due and owing can be found in the record: 
All plaintifffs trial exhibits. Finance charges were 
only assessed by plaintiff after billing, not from date 
of performance. 
R. 423: Bills were sometimes not sent out until a month 
or two after equipment was repaired in order to assure 
the problem was fixed before requesting payment. 
Indicates that payment was not expected until bill sent. 
Trial Exhibit 25: In letter from David Williams to Mac 
Petersen, Mr. Williams several times refers to the 
invoices as bills. 
R. 447 & 453: Testimony indicates that invoices are 
bills. 
Overall, the evidence indicates that Judcje Hanson made a 
correct finding of fact. There is no clear error. Moreover, 
defendant has not even appealed the court's finding that plaintiff 
performed the work satisfactorily and was not paid. The Utah 
Supreme Court has said "when an admitted service has been rendered 
and not paid for, natural justice makes a strong appeal." Bishop 
v. Parker, 134 P.2d 180, 182-183 (Utah 1943). Under these 
circumstances this court should affirm the lower court's decision. 
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C. credit Sales Without a Specified Due Date 
become Due and Payable on Demand. 
The defendant, relying upon the lower court's ruling that the 
defendant did not maintain an "open account" with plaintiff, seems 
to argue that this finding makes plaintiff's sales to defendant 
cash transactions. If this is what defendant is saying this is 
simply incorrect. In the first place plaintiff never received any 
cash, or else we would not be before this court. Furthermore, a 
review of the evidence, arguments and rulings makes it apparent 
that the plaintiff's sales and services were rendered on credit 
even though defendant may not have had an "open account" with the 
plaintiff. Finally, as a matter of law credit sales such as these 
are not due and payable until demand, unless an agreement specifies 
the due date. 
The issue of whether an open account exists is relevant in 
this case for those unpaid invoices that were billed prior to 
September of 1985 and were thus barred by the four year Statute of 
Limitations unless they could fall into the open account exception 
of §78-12-25 of the Utah Code. Under this exception, invoices 
billed more than four years prior to filing the suit would not be 
barred by the Statute of Limitations if the invoices were part of 
a series of charges on an "open account." Defendant contended 
before and during trial that the series of charges did not 
constitute an open account, but were independent transactions. 
Relying upon Bishop v. Parker, 134 P.2d 180, 182-183 (Utah 1943) 
defendant argued that eleven elements were required for an open 
account. 
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1. An Account; 
2. Usually kept; 
3. Properly kept; 
4. By express or implied agreement; 
5. Containing a connected series of debit and credit entriets 
or reciprocal charges and allowances; 
6. Having as an intention of the parties that individual 
items not be considered independently; but as a 
continuation of a related series; 
7. Account kept open; 
8. Subject to shifting balance; 
9. Open until either party settles or closes account; 
10. One single and indivisible liability; 
11. Liability fixed at time of settlement after last entry. 
(R. 281). 
Defendant argued that an open account did not exist because 
these elements, especially those of a running account balance, and 
a relationship between transactions were not present. (R. 282-283) 
The defendant stated the evidence "more properly described a credit 
account arrangement or a quote and billing practice." (R. 282) 
Thus, at trial defendant did not argue that the transactions were 
not credit arrangements, only that the credit transactions, when 
viewed together, did not constitute an open account. 
In ruling on the issue of open account the court said: 
On the plaintiff's claim that it dealt with the defendant 
on an open account, the Court is satisfied that the 
elements of establishing an open account have not been 
met by the plaintiff. 
(R. 310) (emphasis added). 
The court went on to hold that invoices billed more than four 
years before suit was commenced are barred by the Statute of 
Limitations and plaintiff has not appealed that decision. However, 
the language of the ruling makes it apparent that the court was 
only ruling that the elements for an open account did not exist, 
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not that the sales were not credit transactions. Clearly the sales 
were credit transactions since the time and materials billing only 
allowed payment after performance and billing. Mac Petersen 
clearly believed he was providing services on credit. (R. 470-471) 
Even the defendant's closing argument admitted that the evidence 
pointed toward "a credit account arrangement or a quote and billing 
practice." (R. 282) 
Defendant asserts that it is "universally held" that the 
Statute of Limitations commences running on performance. Defendant 
draws support for this statement from §70A-2-310(a) of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code. However, defendant overlooks §70A-2-
310(d), the subsection applicable to credit sales which states: 
where the seller is required or authorized to ship the 
goods on credit the credit period runs from the time of 
shipment but postdating the invoice or delaying its 
dispatch will correspondingly delay the starting of the 
credit period. 
(emphasis added) 
In the present case in those circumstances where plaintiff 
delayed billing/ the credit period did not begin to run until the 
bill was sent. If the credit period did not start during that time 
the Statute of Limitations did not begin to run. 
With respect to credit sales the correct "universal rule" has 
been articulated as follows: 
If the contract fixes no time for payment, payment is due 
on demand, unless the debtor is admittedly unable to pay, 
which obviates the necessity for making a demand.5 
5
 60 Am Jur 2d, P. 887. 
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Accordingly, this court, as a matter of law as well as upon 
the findings of fact, should affirm the lower court, 
II. 
THE PLAINTIFF PROPERLY RELIED UPON DON LLOYD'S APPARENT 
AUTHORITY WHEN IT ORDERED A GENERATOR FROM ITS SUPPLIER. 
DEFENDANT IS BOUND BY THE ACTIONS OF HIS AGENT. 
With respect to defendant's argument that his agent, Mr. Don 
Lloyd, had no authority to purchase a new generator, an overall 
reading of the testimony shows that in making his argument, 
defendant has selectively pointed this court to the evidence most 
favorable to his own position. The defendant ignores the fact that 
the lower court in this case consistently found plaintiff's 
evidence more believable both on the agency issue and on all other 
issues.6 
Defendant again urges that no deference be given to the lower 
court's findings of fact that defendant's agent had apparent 
authority to purchase a generator. (appellant's brief p. 2) 
However, even in reading the agency issue as defemdant has stated 
it, it is clear that the issue is one of fact, to which the 
"clearly erroneous" standard of review applies.7 In its memorandum 
decision in this case, the court said: 
On the issue of the generator, the Court finds that the 
plaintiff supplied a new generator to the defendant at 
the request of defendant's agent. While the defendant 
6At R. 308 Court suggests defendant's evidence on the agency 
issue is not believable. At R. 307, court states defendant's 
evidence is "inconsistent and non persuasive." At R. 309 Court 
states that plaintiff's evidence is the most "believable and 
logical." 
7See discussion of Standard of Review p. 8 to 10, Supra. 
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disputes that his agent had the authority to order a new 
generator, there is no believable evidence that would 
suggest that the plaintiff had been made aware of the 
defendant's directions to his agent at the time the order 
for the new generator was placed. Defendant's agent. 
when the order was placed for the new generator rather 
than the rebuilt generator, had apparent authority to act 
on behalf of this principal, the defendant, and the 
testimony shows that the ordering of a new generator was 
in any event economically advisable when done. 
Accordingly, if the defendant has problems with the 
commitments made to third parties, including the 
plaintiff, by the defendant's agent, the defendant should 
look to his agent in that regard. 
(R. 308-3 09) (emphasis added) (Also, see. Finding of Fact number 
8, R. 334 which states in part "[D]defendant's agent had apparent 
authority to act on behalf of defendant in purchasing the 
generator.") 
Having made these findings of facts, this court need only 
determine if the findings are against the clear weight of evidence. 
An overall review of the testimony and documentary evidence 
presented to the court demonstrates that Judge Hanson's findings of 
fact on the issue of agency and the ordering of the generator are 
supported and are not clearly erroneous. 
A. Don Lloyd had Actual and Apparent Authority 
to act on Behalf of Defendant in Purchasing 
Goods and Services. 
At trial, Don Lloyd was called as a witness for the defendant. 
Mr. Lloyd testified he worked for the defendant for over thirteen 
years. (R. 579) During that time he worked as Service Manager at 
one of Mr. Williams' companies and simultaneously as Chief Engineer 
at another. (R. 580-592) Mr. Lloyd related several occasions 
where he, acting as defendant's authorized agent and employee, 
contacted plaintiff and ordered work or materials. (see e.g. R. 
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585 lines 12-24, R. 608, lines 3-10) Part of Mr. Lloyd"s 
responsibilities were to deal with vendors. (R. 594) This 
responsibility included Mr. Lloyd contacting vendors and telling 
them to perform the work or deliver the goods. (R. 594, R. 608 
lines 3-10, R. 619) Mr. Lloyd said on many purchases he did not 
need specific authority from Mr. Williams. (R. 595) On some 
occasions when materials or work was ordered from plaintiff, bv Mr. 
Don Lloyd, Mr. Williams was present thereby clearly indicating to 
plaintiff that Mr. Lloyd was acting with Mr. Williams1 approval. 
(R. 424-425) 
Mr. Harold Schmidt also testified about the nature of Mr. 
Lloyd's authority. Mr. Schmidt worked for another vendor that soLd 
to defendant. Mr. Schmidt testified that Mr. Lloyd signed work 
orders on behalf of defendant. (R. 629, lines 10-25) Mr. Lloyd 
signed on behalf of defendant for the receipt of goods ordered on 
credit. (R. 631, lines 11-19; R. 632, lines 1-4) 
Mr. Wen Winegar, officer of another vendor, gave further 
examples of Mr. Lloyd acting on behalf of defendant in ordering 
goods and services. (R. 624-626) To Mr. Winegar's company, Don 
Lloyd "was the man to talk to" when dealing with defendant's 
companies. (R. 62 6, line 4) In dealing with Mr. Winegar's company 
Mr. Lloyd made the initial contacts, negotiated the price, and gave 
final approval for the work. (R. 623-627) 
Mac Petersen testified similarly about his company's dealings 
with defendant's companies. Mr. Petersen testified that he had 
known and worked with Don Lloyd as defendant's employee for many 
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years, (R. 396) Mr, Lloyd was Mr. Williams' "key employee" and 
"Dave's right-hand man." According to Mr. Petersen, "whatever Dave 
wanted, turned it over to Don, and Don went about it, and got the 
job done." (R. 396, lines 20-25). 
Mr. Williams himself clearly led plaintiff and others to 
believe that Don Lloyd had complete authority to negotiate prices, 
make purchases, order work and even modify agreements. On at least 
two occasions, defendant sent Don Lloyd in his place to negotiate 
changes in prices on unpaid invoices. On those occasions Mr. 
Williams said "Don will handle it" or "I sent Don over to take care 
of those." (R. 397, lines 3-9) Don Lloyd handled most, but not 
all, of the credit purchases. (R. 397, lines 10-12) As already 
noted, Mr. Williams was present on some occasions as Mr. Lloyd 
ordered materials or work from plaintiff. (R. 397-398) 
Even the defendant himself testified that Mr. Lloyd dealt with 
plaintiff in the sale or exchange of materials. (R. 527, lines 6-
9) The defendant testified that Mr. Lloyd was a trusted and 
valuable employee. (R. 542) Mr. Williams said Mr. Lloyd could 
make purchases without Mr. Williams approval if it were "urgent." 
(R. 544-545) Other employees were authorized to make purchases on 
behalf of defendant as well. (R. 546, lines 1-7) 
From these facts brought forth at trial, the lower court's 
conclusion that Mr. Lloyd had apparent authority to act on behalf 
of Mr. Williams in ordering a new generator is well supported. Mr. 
Lloyd was dealing with plaintiff in the same manner as he had for 
more than a decade. Furthermore, as the lower court found, 
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ordering a new generator, as opposed to rebuilding the old 
generator, made economic sense in light of the circumstances. 
It should be kept in mind that a portable generator only has 
two main parts. The first is the gasoline engine that turns the 
generator, the second is the electricity generating armature. (P. 
642) When plaintiff initially discussed a rebuild with Mr. 
Williams, none of the parties were aware that the armature needed 
to be replaced. (R. 432, 568) At that time the parties only knew 
that the engine would not start because it was "seized up." (R. 
431, 641) Only after repairs on the engine commenced was it 
discovered the armature was also ruined. (R. 432, 642) This meant 
that virtually the entire generator needed to be replaced and 
defendant would be economically ahead buying a new generator 
instead of rebuilding the old. (R. 436, 605) Also, the old 
generator's manufacturer recommended against fixing a burned out 
armature. (R. 642) A burned armature is a serious and expensive 
problem. (R. 642, lines 20-25) At trial plaintiff's former shop 
foreman, an expert in the field, testified the burned out armature 
left the generator "worthless." (R. 644) 
The discovery of the burned out armature chcinged everything. 
Rebuilding the engine portion did not make sense since defendant 
would still be left with a generator that was ruined. At that 
point, defendant had three choices: (1) have the plaintiff rebuild 
the engine only, as had previously been discussed by Mr. Williams 
and Mr. Petersen, (leaving defendant with a still worthless 
generator); (2) have plaintiff rebuild the engine and armature for 
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about the same cost as a new generator; or (3) order a new 
generator for about the same cost as a rebuild. Because the first 
alternative was really no alternative at all, the circumstances 
required a decision to be made by the defendant whether to rebuild 
the entire unit or to order a new generator. Where plaintiff had 
been dealing with Mr. Lloyd as defendant's "right hand man" for 
more than a decade, and was accustomed to dealing with Mr. Williams 
and Mr. Lloyd interchangeably (R. 397), plaintiff acted reasonably 
when it relied upon Mr. Lloyd's instructions to order a new 
generator. 
Defendant attempts to make a point that plaintiff should have 
inquired into the scope of Mr. Lloyd's authority since Mr. Williams 
had only ordered a repair of the old generator. This argument 
might have had some merit had it not been discovered that the 
armature was burned out. However, the burned out armature made the 
old arrangements obsolete. Under these new circumstances Mr. 
Lloyd, acting with apparent authority, entered into a new contract. 
It should be remembered that Don Lloyd called plaintiff to place 
the order, plaintiff did not call defendant. (R. 434) Moreover, 
plaintiff was ambivalent as to whether defendant purchased a new 
generator or fixed the old generator since selling a new generator 
did not generate more revenues for the plaintiff than did 
rebuilding the old generator. Plaintiff simply felt defendant 
would be ahead with a new generator. (R. 436, lines 1-5) 
Accordingly, plaintiff had no reason to expect that Mr. Lloyd was 
acting improperly. Even Mr. Lloyd testified he thought defendant 
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would approve a new generator. (R. 600-601) There was nothing out 
of the ordinary about Mr. Lloyd's call. Everything in plaintiff's 
many years of dealing with defendant told plaintiff that Don Lloyd 
had authority to place such an order. As far as plaintiff knew Mr. 
Lloyd was acting with Mr. Williams1 approval. 
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the agent, Mr. 
Lloyd, did not vary the terms of an existing contract. Instead 
changed circumstances made the old contract impossible in the sense 
that a mere engine repair would not accomplish the goal of giving 
defendant a working generator. These circumstances necessitated 
the formation of an entirely new contract. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated (in the chief case relied 
upon by defendant): 
[T]he general principle of the law of agency is that 
principals are bound by the acts of their agents which 
are within the apparent scope of the authority of the 
agency and a principal will not be permitted to deny such 
authority against innocent third parties who have relied 
on that authority. 
Forsyth v. Pendleton. 617 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah 1980). The plaintiff 
in this case is an innocent third party that relied upon an agent 
acting within the apparent scope of his authority. The apparent 
authority is adequately established by the testimony. This court 
should not overturn the lower court's findings in this regard. 
The defendant also argues that plaintiff attempted to deceive 
defendant into believing that plaintiff had actually rebuilt the 
old generator. It should be kept in mind that the first that the 
plaintiff learned that Mr. Lloyd may have ordered the new generator 
without the approval of Mr. Williams was after Mr. Petersen had 
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ordered the generator from his supplier, had taken delivery of the 
new generator, and sent a invoice to the defendant. Mr. Lloyd 
intercepted the invoice and called Mr. Petersen to write up the 
invoice as if the generator was a rebuilt generator. Both Mr. 
Lloyd and Mr. Petersen's testimony agree in the fact that this is 
the first Mr. Petersen learned of the problem. Accordingly, by the 
time plaintiff learned of the problem he had already performed his 
part of the bargain. If there was deception by Mr. Lloyd, Mr. 
Petersen was its chief victim. If Mr. Petersen had any idea that 
the new generator was not wanted he would not have special ordered 
it from his supplier. 
The defendant has presented no compelling reason to overturn 
the lower court's finding of fact that apparent authority existed 
in defendant's agent. While defendant has cited an ancient out of 
state case for a general principle of law that an agent with 
authority to enter contracts, cannot vary a contract made by a 
principal, the facts of this case are different. The agent in this 
case ordered a new generator when it became clear that the old 
generator was worthless and could not be economically repaired. 
The agent had a long history of dealing with plaintiff and others 
in similar circumstances. Plaintiff's reliance upon agent was 
reasonable. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should affirm the decision of the lower 
court. 
DATED this 14th day of August, 1992. 
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